Strategic Readiness System (SRS) Initiative. The paper contains: a review of the readiness system used by the Department of Defense with a focus on the Chairman's Readiness System and its relationship to the Army readiness management; a synopsis of several recent assessments of DoD and Army readiness systems to include observations from the General Accounting Office; descriptions of the DoD activities to revise readiness reporting and the SRS initiative; an assessment of how likely the SRS initiative is to meet expectations, and; recommendations for improving the SRS and its implementation. The intent of this paper is to serve a brief description of the SRS environment and to identifying some of the challenges facing SRS implementation.
READINESS SYSTEM IN TRANSFORMATION
European-centric Cold War were by most standards successful. This success is due in part because the Army was able to develop and effectively implement a readiness system that integrated the changing missions and role of the Army while preserving the accuracy and integrity of the system.' General Abrams appreciated that for the organization to be effective, adapting the readiness system for an uncertain future must be sustained through a cultural preparedness to, "accept those internal changes in technique, organization," and "a readiness to understand the variety of task^."^ A quarter of a century later, the Army has again embarked on a transformation. With the announcement in October 1999 and the publication of several documents, today's Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, echoed the themes expressed by general Abrams by stating, "soldiers remain the center piece ... it will take trained, educated, disciplined, tough and dedicated soldiers.. . to implement change, transformation,. .. and achieve the Army vision."
The Army's conversion to an Objective Force is a highly recognizable aspect of the Army Vision and to a large extent represents the goal of transformation. Similar to the last transformation period, there are several internal changes and enhancements which must be implemented for the Army to achieve the goal. One such enhancement is the revision of the Army readiness system.
As the Army develops new and revised means of conducting military operations, the service is studying revisions to methods of assessing readiness. To be effective, this revised readiness system must meet the expectations and requirements established by both the Army transformation and those encased in a concurrent Department of Defense transformation.
Several expectations are contained within the Army Posture Statement 2001 and the United
Stares Army White Paper on Concepts for the Obiective Force. Three of these expectations appear to have the most direct impact on enhancements to the readiness reporting system. First, the changes must be "harmonized" with related changes and efforts within DoD. A portion of this harmonization is achieved by ensuring the Army continues to meet the requirements established within the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to support the Combatant Commanders (CinCs) while executing the three paths (legacy, interim and objective) of transformation. ' Next, changes must reflect that the Army's move towards an offensively oriented force diminishes the applicability of cold war metrics used today to assess warfighting readiness. Lastly, the objective force, and enablers like the readiness reporting system, must be developed and implemented in a manner that ensures synchronization across advances and changes in doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, material and soldiers (DTLOMS).' In broad terms, the Army expectations require a readiness system that is harmonized with DoD systems, reflects the characteristics of the post-cold war force, and is synchronized with activities across DTLOMS.
Important aspects and expectations of the DoD transformation were published recently in the September 30,2001 , Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR 2001 . Many of the comments contained within the report align closely with the Army transformation expectations highlighted above. The QDR 2001 directs the departmerit to move away from a cold war era threat based model towards a capabilities-based system. To be effective, the review emphasizes the necessity for greater jointness and leveraging of joint capabilities. As part of the department-wide transformation, critical decisions will be made based on the trade-offs between near-term unit readiness and longer-term capitalization requirements. These tradeoff decisions must be supported by sound business practices and reliable information. According to the QDR 2001, risk management, to include reporting capabilities, managing shortfalls and projecting capabilities, will be critical as the department pursues the transformation to a capabilities-based approach. The review calls for developing a broad portfolio of capabilities for use in less predictive environments, and a movement away from static threat based methods (e.g., JSCP scenario based assessments) for gauging preparedness and readiness. Future commanders will need capabilities-based forces driven by far less predictive requirements. Rapid assessment of available capabilities will become the norm. Strengthening joint capabilities via task-organized and scalable modular units will be a hallmark in the future.
Beyond these expectations, the QDR reflects an intent to move the DoD competencies from forces able to "respond to the full spectrum" of conflict threats, to a force envisioned with "capabilities to deter ...defeat... and institutions to extend America's asymmetric advantages into the f~t u r e . "~ AS defined in QDR 2001, this capability-based concept will drive planning, assessing risk, and managing operational demands. This change to a paradigm of force planning based on capabilities and a less-defined threat presents some challenges. The capability-based framework will likely become a critical precept of how future DoD leadership influences Service efforts to develop, assemble, train, report, employ and transform forces for the foreseeable future. This precept will require the Army to establish new or revise existing mechanisms to manage critical capability-indicators across time and among functional areas.
The transition to a capability-based force has been expected and several aspects of Army Transformation can be revised now to better meet these challenges. The Army readiness reporting system is one aspect of transformation that can benefit from further refinement.
With some modification, the US Army Strategic Readiness System (SRS) initiative provides a favorable answer to meeting the challenge of managing the force. With enhancements the system can properly address a force characterized more by capabilities than static linkages to well-defined scenarios and cold war metrics. The SRS program is innovative in areas such information technology, but is still much the product of the old strategy and related information demands. This paper explores points in which the SRS program can exploit the Army's transformation successes in order to meet the future informational and decision making requirements. To identify points of exploitation the paper includes: a description of the current readiness reporting program (e.g., the chairman's readiness system); a synopsis of observations indicating shortcomings within the existing system (e.g., Government Accounting Office reports); a highlight of Department of Defense and Army initiatives in the area of revising the readiness system (e.g., the Department of Defense Readiness Assessment Initiative); and, an assessment of the Strategic Readiness System's potential to meet expectations along with recommendations for enhancements to SRS. The paper will be available as a near-term resource for those looking at alternatives to SRS features, and as a limited record of challenges facing the Army as it establishes some of the actual organizations, techniques and procedures required to sustain transformation within today's DoD environment.
WHAT IS READINESS AND WHY MEASURE IT?
The term readiness as applied within the military goes beyond the common dictionary definition of a quality of being ready, or possessing a willingness. In the case of the Army, managing readiness is defined through two aspects. First where readiness is the ability of a unit to deliver the output for which it is designed, and second where readiness management is a means to balance trade offs between sustaining levels of current capabilities and the development of future capabilities. In order to support these two aspects of readiness management, Army readiness includes three general categories: unit readiness, force readiness and military capability. l o The definition of unit readiness most closely aligns with a definition of readiness as the ability of a unit to deliver the desired output. The wide-spread Army interpretation of output is embodied in task lists. A unit's most essential tasks are contained in the Mission Essential Task List (METL). The Army defines METL as ,"A compilation of collective mission essential tasks which must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its wartime mission(^)."'^ Force readiness is defined as the ability of the Army, within established structure, to: station, control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train in peacetime. In addition, for the Army to be a ready force these peacetime activities are accomplished while being able to: call up, mobilize, prepare, deploy, employ and sustain forces in war. Military capability is broader than force readiness. DoD defines military capability in terms of a component's force readiness, sustainability, structure, modernization, investment and infrastructure.
The need for efficient and effective allocation of resources is one major reason many of the higher agencies measure readiness. Given an understanding and record of how resources have been allocated, agencies interpret readiness measures to determine, cause and effect relationships between the allocated resources and the return in readiness. In this way the JOINT MONTHLY READINESS REVIEW.
The JMRR provides a current and relatively broad assessment of readiness using three
The Joint Monthly Readiness Review 
GLOBAL STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM (GSORTS).
The Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) is the internal management tool used by CJCS, services, and CINCs. It is a central registry of unit information designed to provide a current snapshot of unit status in terms of the four traditional areas. This information system supports crisis planning, deliberate planning and management activities concerning organizing, equipping and training forces. GSORTS is a primary information data source for Joint operations Planning and execution System (JOPES) and portions of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
US ARMY READINESS SYSTEM
The Army readiness system, which centers on the Unit Status Report (USR), provides status of forces information to the service leadership and to external entities (e.g., CJCS, Combatant Commands, and Support Agencies) though its interface with GSORTS. Figure 5 3 Reporting Units --=Unit level reports are submitted from detachments, separate companies, and battalions.
. Under the USR, the assessments are comprised of both objective and subjective measures. The objective measures, (personnel availability, equipment on hand and equipment serviceability) find much of their origin in the last transformation. At that time readiness was linked significantly with the preparedness of the Army to meet cold-war tasks of a defensive nature. In recognition of changing requirements, the Army, along with the CJCS, recently developed a measure for personnel deployment tempo (Deptempo) in an effort to measure the rates at which unit personnel are deployed away from their home facilities. For the most part, these objective measures are independent of the operational JSCP scenario and reflect service requirements for general readiness levels (force readiness). The primary subjective measures (e.g., days to train METL proficiency and mission effectiveness estimate (MAE)) are reflected in numerical form but are based on commander's ability to assess his unit using both the objective indicators and hidher expert subjective knowledge.
HOW WELL DO TODAY'S SYSTEMS FULFILL REQUIREMENTS?
The recent Army Posture Statement provides an overall assessment of today's reporting system, "Our current standards are a Cold War legacy and reflect neither the complexity of today's strategic and operational environments nor other important factors." 24 In addition to assessing current readiness mechanisms as inappropriate for today's environment, the posture statement also stresses that a future more effective system requires accuracy, objectivity and uniformity. Recent assessments and reviews have echoed the shortcomings outlined in the Army Posture Statement, and listed specific areas of concern along with potential remedies. In testimony before Congress the Deputy Director of Defense for Readiness, and the Director of the Army budget indicated the Army systems needs to move more towards: timely and more accurate measurements; development of better tools to support employment decisions; and implementation of a more robust system to meet the challenge associated with transforming the service while maintaining required readiness and capabilities.25
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE AND CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVATIONS.
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has maintained a long standing indictment of the Army readiness system and readiness indicators in particular. In multiple reports over the last 6 years, the GAO has cited several shortcomings related to the indicators themselves and the inability of the system to effectively address the requirements placed on the Army.
According to the GAO, the current system and its indicators are not comprehensive and fail to provide any predictive ability to signal change nor provide for trend analysis.26 In particular, the GAO determined that the measures in use today do not provide insight into critical factors such as mobility, morale, and leadership. The C-ratings (C-I for high readiness down to C-5 for the lowest readiness level) represent a simple snapshot and provide no insight into potential changes in status. In addition to an inability to project changes, the GAO stresses that important indicators such as training have become almost solely subjective in nature. Also related to the defined C-ratings is a lack of jointness in the system. The GAO cited the definition of the C-ratings as inhibiting the ability to assess preparedness of forces for integration into joint The IDA report provides a set of recommendations for improvements in three areas:
readiness reporting system changes, management actions and congressional actions. In the area of readiness reporting system changes the report recommends requiring services to report readiness in terms of their ability to perform mission essential tasks associated with the full range of assignmed missions. This includes both the tasks assigned by the Secretary of Defense and those found within the Title 10 responsibilities.
While the current GSORTS system includes many individual units within the services, the IDA report recommends an expansion of the elements included to represent all readinessrelated units and entities under the control of CinCs, Services and Defense Agencies. IDA concluded the Army must go beyond the tactical units of battalion and brigades and include entities, such as a transportation control center, whose readiness is integral to executing a Combatant Commander's mission essential task.
Data management was found to be lacking within the readiness system. IDA identified the need to develop a better management information system for collecting, reporting and analyzing data. Within DoD, activities that depend on inefficient methods must be removed or revised. IDA cited that the current readiness system requires redundant data collections and in the case of the Army is using lagging indicators for analysis. The lag time determined within the study indicates reports are assessed up to 30 days after the lowest level commander has reported readiness information.
As described within the IDA report the ultimate characteristic of an improved readiness reporting system, is one that improves in these three areas while placing the overall concept of readiness in a systems approach. When completely implemented, the system would base readiness reporting more on the system(s) required to achieve a mission essential task, rather than assessing a subset of units and entities.32
In the second area of management actions, the reports lists recommended actions including the issuance of detailed instructions to support implementation of changes, the establishment of a readiness analysis center to support activities within DoD and the expansion of current Contingency Planning Guidance to include guidelines for the services on executing mission essential tasks in support of CinC plans.
The last area of congressional action includes recommendations designed to improve information flow between the Department of Defense and members of Congress. These included amending and consolidating Title 10 requirements into one section of the law, limiting the number of reporting requirements, and allowing members to have the ability to directly access readiness information from the automated web-based system of the future.
READINESS INITIATIVES SUPPORTING TRANSFORMATION
The CSA characterizes the future challenge associated with readiness reporting as one that involves, "re-examining how to measure Army readiness in the near-term, the long-term and across the range of missions we may be expected to ~n d e r t a k e . "~~ His vision is for a new reporting system that will, "provide timely and accurate information on the status of The Army's readiness, with measurements that are relevant and quantifiable, to enhance the ability of commanders to make the best possible employment d e c i~i o n s . "~~ Today, the Army's Strategic
Readiness System Initiative is the response to this challenge and the means through which the identifying units and organizations that must report readiness to include components of systems not previously included in the readiness program (e.g., joint units, intelligence centers; task forces, headquarters); arraying unit capabilities and training statuses in terms of Mission Essential Tasks (METs); enhancing informational management tools to capture data from transactional activities such as personnel and equipment; expanding the range of force employment scenarios used to test readiness and identify risk; and exploring the means to assess readiness and preparedness of support structures (e.g., components of the industrial base) to fulfill operational (warfighting) requirements.
While not exhaustive, these two examples of DoD activities indicate the types of modifications being explored for the DoD readiness system. It is through these and other similar initiatives that the Army may harmonize its efforts by maintaining awareness of activities beyond the Army.
ARMY STRATEGIC READINESS SYSTEM (SRS)
As described by the CSA in the 2001 Posture Statement, 'We are re-examining how to measure Army readiness in the near-term, the long-term and across the range of missions we may be expected to ~ndertake."'~ The SRS initiative is a prominent aspect of the Army's reexamination of readiness and how to report and manage it. Recent presentations on the SRS initiative characterize three primary reasons for the enhancing the system through SRS. First, the operating environment changed dramatically after 1989 with the Army's transition from a Cold War environment dominated by a defensive orientation and forward deployed forces to a force projection Army. The implementation of our present-day national strategy places requirements for forces and capabilities that are no longer aligned with what had become traditional Major Theater War (MTW) scenarios. Second, the Army is increasingly required to provide forces and capabilities outside of those forces pre-coordinated under the static guidance ( e.g., external to JSCP apportioned forces). The increasingly dynamic demands placed on the Army, coupled with the detrimental impacts generated by lagging indicators of readiness (e.g., 30-day old personnel fill statistics), indicated that the current system was inadequate to manage readiness. Third, Congressional interest in change was often cited as a reason to review the existing system. Based on opinions on the part of members of Congress that inaccuracies existed within the Army system, congressional action was taken to direct the Army to institute a more objective and timely system. In addition to identifying shortcomings in timeliness and objectivity, Congress also expressed concerns that the Army system was incomplete and failed to report on substantial portions of the Army that contribute to overall effecti~eness.~~ Characterized as broad and nearly all-encompassing, the SRS is envisioned as an enterprise-wide readiness management tool, that permits the senior Army leadership to evaluate the readiness of the Army as a whole and make decisions that affect the future readiness of the force. Informational briefings and updates characterize SRS as a decision support tool that when completed will: be accurate, scaleable, objective, flexible and timely in its measurement of the Army's ability to support the National Military Strategy and Title 10 requirements; be the transformation readiness reporting system; enable senior Army leadership to influence strategic readiness across the Army; use readiness performance measures that measure the entire force; and fundamentally change the readiness reporting culture.38 The general SRS timeline includes validation and initial capability followed by partial implementation in FY 03.
In the efforts to attain CSA objectives, the Army is developing the SRS into a system that will assist in managing both the operational and institutional aspects of Army readiness. At the macro level, SRS applies the CSA strategic guidance of: investing in soldiers and families;
transforming the army; maintaining support for CinCs, and; adopting sound business practices.
The guidance is applied within SRS by integrating the traditional functional view of readiness Before proceeding with the development of tactical and operational level (e.g., units)
aspects of the SRS, the effort will address scorecard development related to eleven major business areas (base operations; civilian human resources; institutional training; depot maintenance operations; supply management; ordnance; information support; acquisition process; research and development; laboratories; contracting process and; test and evaluation).
Development and mapping of unit readiness tools are slated as a follow on efforts.
A structure for the SRS interface has been established. This interface is designed to allow reporting at the lowest level practical/appropriate and the review/query from multiple levels to include the CSA and the Secretary of the Army level. The concept allows higher echelons to drill down through subject regions in order to identify readiness shortcomings and areas of interests. While not exhaustive in describing all the aspects of the SRS initial design, Figure 8 below provides an appreciation for the hierarchical frames work (series of subordinate directories on the left portion) and the readiness area's (in this case the infrastructure area) system has yet to be developed.
WILL TODAY'S INITIATIVES MEET REQUIREMENTS?
The results of assessing the Army readiness initiative indicate that without some midcourse corrections in the program the system fielded in FY 03 will fall short of meeting Table 2 provides an overview of the results of the assessment. The scale of Red-AmberGreen represents an ordinal scale to indicate the amount of change required in the SRS to meet expectations. Green represents an assessment of no significant change required. Amber I indicates change required but achievable within the existing SRS frame work, and Red warns that the expectation will not be met without revisions to the SRS.
The strength in the program comes from the efforts of many key leaders to date as well as the focus to first address predominantly internal aspects of readiness such as data management and resource allocation within the Army. The shortcomings become more significant as the expectations for greater involvement on the part of DoD, Congress and CinCs are levied on the system. In order to meet the CSA expectation of harmonizing activities with the joint community (while strengthening jointness) the SRS will need to incorporate likely changes to the CiNC readiness system data requirements. In addition, the implementation at the DoD and CinC levels of changes resulted from the transformation to a capabilities-based force will also necessitate changes in the eventual Army system. The SRS was born into an environment where the JMRR, along with GSORTS (and their reliance on major scenarios as the basis for readiness assessments) were two critical consumers of Army readiness data. As a major aspect of the SRS is improved data and metrics, it does not yet anticipate ongoing changes to the DoD methods for readiness management, or potential changes to the JMRR.
Failure to tailor the SRS to meet emerging changes in higher readiness systems will, at a minimum, require the Army to continue its reliance on additional data call, and augmentation means to address routine requirements. The carryover of the pre-existing functional methodology (personnel, equipment, training, infrastructure, funding) along with the priority to development of business areas metrics, does not provide a viable means to achieve expectations related to capability and scalability. This reliance on the existing framework and the related requirements for multiple data calls will continue to place a continued unintended burden on the force.
SRS IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN TRANSFORMATION
By the CSA's own assessment, the re-engineered readiness reporting system is a critical aspect of the transformation program, and will be a critical component of the transformed army.
Regardless of the eventual final form of the SRS, ultimately to be successful it must become an integral part of the Army's contribution to the overall DoD readiness system. To become that integral part, the SRS must be empowered by a transformation campaign plan of its own. SRS should be integrated into the larger Army transformation and equally integrated into the transformation within the larger readiness management environment of Congress, DoD and the combatant commands. To be as successful as possible, the SRS program should sustain efforts in those areas that are on track to meet expectations and take immediate action to develop means to correct aspects of the SRS which fail to meet expectations. Described below are candidate areas or actions which if properly addressed will enhance the SRS.
The functional view retains too much of the previous system to be effective in the new environment. The readiness of a capabilities-based force can no longer be determined by limited measures such percentages of personnel fill, and operational readiness rates for equipment. The eventual SRS must possess measures that break with traditional functional metrics as measures of readiness and move towards capability measures that link essential tasks to CinC requirements. These capability measures should be developed by analyzing CinC requirements to determine contributing capabilities for which the Army is responsible.
With established capability requirements linkages can be made to match organizations METs, and supporting Army systems with the CinC requirements. In this manner, the Army will be in a position to respond to availability of capabilities, regardless of scenarios.
Recently, there have been other efforts to evaluate potential enhancements in military readiness management systems. To varying degrees a few of these efforts have explored areas related to the focus of SRS initiative. These include the IDA work on building a Joint Training Readiness Reporting System (JTRRS).~~ While not a complete replacement to the SRS, the IDA report on the JTRRS does address aspects of a semi-automated method for: identifying tasks essential to performance of joint missions; communicating these tasks to assure understanding within a joint environment, and; communicating to superior commands the joint mission-oriented training readiness levels of specific forces. Integrating the best of solutions described in IDA JTRRS and other similar efforts may serve to improve the SRS. If similar solutions are adopted by others within the joint community, the resulting systems may present greater joint interoperability.
The new system, no matter what the final state, will be expansive and represent an integral portion of the Army transformation. Its implementation will most likely signal a change in how the Army addresses unit readiness and performance. To be effective, the Army must plan for this aspect of cultural change.40 As such, the implementation of SRS represents one aspect of the larger cultural change encased in Army Transformation. To enhance the sustained acceptance of this change, the Army should expand the SRS program to take in account DTLOMS related implementation requirements and timelines. An initial implementation of SRS capabilities in FY 03 is beyond the limits of the normal implementation cycle currently experienced among DTLOMS. Without significantly enhancing the timelines needed to integrate the DTLOMS aspects of SRS, the system will possibly be troubled by uneven implementation. A troubled implementation may foment both resentment in the new concepts and retrenchment in existing outdated procedures.
In addressing the multiple categories of readiness and the application of readiness management in the allocation of resources, the SRS has to be tailored to mitigate the aspects that made the current system nearly unresponsive. Testimony before congress indicated that today's system does not have a method to effectively address data requirements associated with routine operations. In response to meeting data requirements for the quarterly report to Congress, a senior Army leader cautioned to ". . .not underestimate the additional man-hour ... requirement associated with the QRRC. Extracting, analyzing and formatting QRRC SORTS data will be a major Army Staff action, measurably impacting upon numerous other staff activities. Compiling basic QRRC data will require accessing, assembling and coordinating the data from no less than eleven different databases managed by various elements across the Army ~t a f f . "~'
The Army readiness system of today, born in part 25 years ago during the last Army transformation, excelled in a demanding cold-war environment, From all indications however, the future dynamic environment constitutes an overmatch for today's readiness system. The challenge presented by the overmatch has been anticipated by the senior Army leadership. As part of the Army Transformation the SRS initiative is designed to remove the overmatch and emplace an effective system capable of addressing the Army-wide needs. To be fully successful the SRS initiative must sustain its accomplishment realized to date while integrating better with readiness related developments in Congress and aspects of the Chairman's Readiness System. Without an improved synchronization with other transformation activities in the overall DoD system, the SRS is likely to suffer from continued shortcomings in data management, harmonization with the joint community, a lack of a systems approach, and an inability to react effectively to changing requirements. In order to meet the goals for reengineering as established by the Chief of Staff of the Army, the SRS initiative must accelerate its DTLOMS related activities, fully participate with Joint and DoD readiness initiatives and develop an implementation program that incorporates the SRS as part of the cultural change of an Army undergoing transformation.
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